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DIVERGENT CLOCKWORK ORANGES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

ERIN M. SAMOuSt
The book A Clockwork Orange centers on a fifteen-year-old boy named Alex.
Alex's hobbies include spending time with his friends, listening to classical music, and orchestrating nightly sprees of robbery, rape, and assault. He also enjoys
stealing cars, beating homeless men on the street, luring adolescent girls into his
home to seduce them, and raping wives in front of their husbands. The root of
this love of the macabre remains unknown, and Alex offers no explanations or
excuses for his behavior. Indeed, it seems to be an intrinsic element of his character. Alex has gone through corrective schooling since age eleven, but these
measures have thus far had no effect on his behavior. His post-corrective officer
warns him, "[Y]ou watch out, little Alex, because next time, as you very well
know, it's not going to be the corrective school anymore. Next time it's going to
be the barry place and all my work ruined."' But unsurprisingly, admonitions
mean little to such a perpetual troublemaker.
The police do soon catch Alex on one of his escapades after he brutally attacks a woman in an effort to rob her home. While Alex is in police custody, the
woman dies from her injuries. Alex is charged with murder and sentenced to
fourteen years in a state prison alongside adults. After some time in prison, Alex
recounts:
It had not been like edifying, indeed it had not, being in this grahzney hellhole and
like human zoo for two years, being kicked and tolchocked by brutal bully warders
and meeting vonny leering like criminals, some of them real perverts and ready to

t Erin M. Samolis is aJ.D. candidate at the University of Chicago Law School. She received her B.A). in
Economics from the University of Chicago in 1999.
1. Anthony Burgess, A Clockwork Orange 38 (Norton 2d ed 1986).
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dribble all over a luscious young malchick like your storyteller.

2

But even when incarcerated in these dirty and overcrowded conditions, Alex
is not the least bit deterred from committing crime again. He dreams of returning to the outside world to continue down the criminal path and vows to be
more careful in the future so as not to get caught. As Alex puts it, "They were
giving another like chance, me having done murder and all, and it would not be
' 3
like fair to get loveted again, after going to all this trouble.
So when an opportunity arises for Alex to shorten his sentence and return
more rapidly to his old way of life, he seizes it. Alex volunteers for a controversial new rehabilitative treatment called Ludovico's Technique, a treatment pioneered by a group of politicians and doctors concerned with the rise in levels of
violent crime. Alex is transferred to another facility where he begins a fortnight
of therapy. During the course of this treatment, Alex is injected daily with an
experimental serum and strapped to a viewing chair with his eyelids clamped
open. He is forced to watch lengthy sessions of film depicting very brutal and
sadistic material, material closely mirroring the violent acts Alex loves to commit.
At first, Alex thinks the movies are a wonderful treat because they are perfectly catered to his interests. However, with each subsequent viewing, Alex
feels increasingly ill. Ludovico's Technique causes him feelings of pain and nausea any time he witnesses or even contemplates violent or sexual acts. He is
therefore physically unable to participate in any acts of violence or indecency. In
this state, according to one of the doctors running the treatment, "He will be
your true Christian ...ready to turn the other cheek, ready to be crucified rather
than crucify, sick to the very heart at the thought of even killing a fly." 4 Although some critics of the program revile the doctors for taking away Alex's
ability to choose his own course of action, proponents fire back that this treatment is the consequence of his initial choice to commit crime. The politicians
involved are not concerned with motive or higher ethics. They are "concerned
only with cutting down crime." 5
After leaving the doctors' care, Alex is completely unable to reintegrate himself into society. His parents will not let him stay in their home, he is unemployed, and because his story has been widely publicized by the media, he becomes an easy target for violent attacks. When assaulted by a mob on one occasion and beaten by corrupt police officers on another, Alex cannot defend himself because of his physical aversion to violence. After one such occasion where
he is left in a wounded and helpless state, a man comes to Alex's aid. This man
happens to be a popular political writer opposed to the current government and
2.

Id at 76.

3.
4.
5.

Id at 98.
Id at 129.
Idat 126.
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eager to use Alex's vulnerable position as a means to disparage the leaders who
pioneered Ludovico's Technique. The sad culmination of this political struggle
is Alex's attempted suicide. The media jumps on this distressing event and fuels
public outrage at the political figures leading the so-called rehabilitative venture.
To quell public indignation, the politicians order doctors to immediately decondition Alex to remove all effects of the Ludovico's Technique from his system. Immediately after the de-conditioning, Alex's mind begins to fill with all
the new acts of violence he wants to commit. He is overjoyed at the prospect of
bring able to return to his old way of life. Alex is not rehabilitated; he is no
longer a "true Christian." But he has regained his ability to choose.
This is the end of the American version of the novel A Clockwork Orange,
the version on which the Stanley Kubrick movie is based. American readers and
viewers are left with a completely unreformed Alex, an Alex that takes pride in
his cruel nightly escapades. The British version of the novel, however, does not
end here. It continues with one final chapter in which Alex begins living a life of
crime once again but soon finds that he no longer wants to continue down this
path. He decides, based on what he has been through and on what his future
might hold, that he wants to change his life for the better. His plans even grow
to include finding a wife and having a son. He is eager to start this new way of
life, saying, 'i would have to start on that tomorrow, I kept thinking. That was
something like new to do. That was something I would have to get started on, a
new like chapter beginning." 6 This Alex is very different from the American
version of Alex. The final chapter of the book leaves the reader with a much
more optimistic view of a person's, especially a young person's, ability to rehabilitate and reform.
Publishers in Great Britain were happy with this ending and bought the
book in its entirety. Therefore, the European translations of the book all include
the author's intended ending. However, when the author attempted to sell the
book in America, no publisher would buy the full novel. The condition of its
sale to a New York publisher in 1962 was its truncation to twenty chapters instead of twenty-one. According to Burgess, the publisher "believed that my
twenty-first chapter was a sell-out... [i]t was bland and it showed a Pelagian
unwillingness to accept that a human being could be a model of unregenerable
evil. The Americans, he said in effect, were tougher than the British and could
face up to reality."7 The Americans obviously wanted no part of the ending being sold to British publishers. It was not until republication in 1986 that the final
chapter was included in an American version.
These separate endings and publishing receptions seem to indicate diverging
views on rehabilitation and juvenile justice on the whole. The more pessimistic
American ending leaves the protagonist in a bloodthirsty state, overjoyed with
6.
7.

Idat 191.
Id at viii (introduction to the 1986 edition).
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his renewed ability to harm others. The British ending indicates a more tolerant
view that recognizes an individual's dynamic capacity to change. Using A Clockwork Orange as a springboard, I would like to discover if these varying social outlooks on juvenile justice and rehabilitation originate the structures of the respective juvenile justice systems and their effectiveness. My goal is to trace the historical developments of both the American and British juvenile justice systems
and examine the practical dissimilarities that might explain differing social views
and offender outcomes.

I. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, juvenile offenders were treated as adults during most
of the nineteenth century, even to the point of receiving the death penalty. 8 Because no separate juvenile court existed, "all offenders were processed through
the same criminal court system, were bound by the same substantive law.., and
were punished in similar fashion." 9 Until the late nineteenth century, the only
way to mitigate harsh adult punishments for children was the infancy defense.10
Under this defense, common law recognized children under age seven as being
unable to take responsibility for their acts, children over fourteen as adults with
the necessary capacity to accept such responsibility, and for those between these
ages a presumption of incapacity was fashioned." Only by showing that the
child appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct could the state rebut a presumed incapacity. 12 Although the infancy defense attempted to allay rising social
concerns for child welfare, an increased uneasiness with retributive punishment
began clearing the way for an even more deep-seated transformation in the
status of children under the law. 13 The infancy defense largely fell into disuse by
14
the late 1920s.
Progressive reformists of the late nineteenth century shifted the social focus
to poor living environments as the cause of juvenile delinquency.' 5 They proposed the institution of separate courts to cure juvenile offenders of the "ill of

8. See Victor L. Streib, Death Penal ,for Children: The American Experience with CapitalPunishmentfor
Cirimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 Okla L Rev 613, 619 (1983) (noting that ninety-five executions have been documented in the United States between 1642 and 1899 for crimes committed by children
under eighteen).
9. See Andrew Walkover, The Infangy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L Rev 503, 509
(1994), citing Kean, The Histog of the Criminali'abili,of Children, 53 Law Q Rev 364 (1937).

10.
11.
12.
execution
13.
14.
15.

Seeidat510.
Seeidat510-11.
See id at 511. See also Godfrey v State, 31 Ala 323, 327 (1858) (state must prove "malice in the
of the act" to rebut presumption of incapacity).
Seeid at 512.
See id at 512-13, citing A. Platt, The ChildSavers: The Invention of Delinquency 139 (Chicago 1969).
See Note, Getting SmartAbout Getting Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibili of Progressive Refomi, 33

Am Crim L Rev 1299, 1302-03 (1996).
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criminality cast upon [them] by circumstance." 16 Children became recognized as
developmentally different from adults and therefore more receptive to intervention.17 Juvenile courts, the first of which opened in 1899,18 served as the means
of this intervention. Unlike their counterparts in adult criminal courts, juvenile
court judges did not constrain the field of their authority merely to the adjudication and sentencing of criminal code violations. 19 "Rather, the juvenile court
used the occasion of an allegation of criminal behavior as an opportunity to
impose upon the young offender a rehabilitative program designed to correct
the socially deviant tendencies that caused the particular law violation." 20 The
goal of the juvenile system was to protect youthful offenders from the harsh
punishments of the adult criminal system. 21 Reformists believed that committing
a child to an adult institution would result in the child "learning the art of the

criminal enterprise," thus diminishing his chances of returning to society as a
productive citizen.22 In essence, "children were no longer to be dealt with as
criminals, but rather through theparenspatriaepower were to be treated as wards
of the state, not fully responsible for their conduct and capable of being rehabilitated." 23
However, starting in the 1960s and picking up momentum, the focus began
to shift away from rehabilitation to retribution in the juvenile justice system. In
Kent v United States,24 the Supreme Court overturned a juvenile court ruling that
waived jurisdiction over a sixteen-year-old charged with robbery and rape, sending him to adult court for trial. 25 The Supreme Court held that juvenile waiver
orders must be grounded in a hearing, that counsel must have access to the records and reports considered by the court, and that a statement of reasons must
accompany the waiver order.26 In addition to imposing these procedural restrictions, the court also noted that the original purpose of the juvenile justice system, grounded on rehabilitation and treatment of youthful offenders, had not
been truly achieved. 2 7 This decision marked the beginning of a transformation
of the juvenile court into a very different institution than the Progressive Era
reformists imagined.
16. See Note, The Inner-Moraliy of Juvenik Justice: The Casefor Consirteny and Legaliy, 18 Cardozo L
Rev 2105, 2111 (1997).
17. See Vincent Schiraldi and Steven A. Drizin, 100 Years ofthe Children'sCourt. Giving Kids the Chance
to Make Better Choice, Corrections Today 24 (Dec 1999).
18. See id.
19. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court.Response to Critics ofJuvenile CourtAbolition,
36 BC L Rev 927, 933-34 (1995).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id at 935, citingJulian W. Mack, TheJuvenik Court, 23 Harv L Rev 104 (1909).
See Ainsworth, 36 BC L Rev at 933-34 (cited in note 19).
See Note, 18 Cardozo L Rev at 2109 (cited in note 16).
Id at 2112, quoting Samuel M. Davis, Rghts ofJuveniles § 1.1 (West 2d ed 1995).
383 US 541 (1966).
See id at 545.
See id at 560-61.
See id at 556.
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In re Gault-8 also signifies a historic shift in the character of juvenile courts.2 9
Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy already on probation for being in the company of
another boy who had stolen a wallet, was taken into custody pursuant to a
neighbor's complaint that she had received lewd and offensive prank telephone
calls. 30 Gault never received notice of the charges and was not afforded the right
to counsel, confrontation, cross-examination of witnesses, or the privilege
against self-incrimination. 3' The juvenile court committed him to a State Industrial School until the age of twenty-one. 32 The Supreme Court held that the essentials of due process, such as notice of charges, assistance of counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against selfincrimination, were required in juvenile court adjudication. 33 The court also focused judicial attention on whether the child had committed the offense as a
prerequisite to sentencing.34 In essence, the decision effectively transferred the
conventional focus of juvenile courts from welfare-guided dispositions to legal
guilt and corresponding punishment. 35 Gault may have been a necessary reform
for a system that had become too arbitrary, but instead of leading to constructive reforms, it led to the dismantling of the juvenile justice system and the galvanization of a liberal movement that cast minors as rights-bearing autonomous
36
citizens, barely distinguishable from adults.
To some, extending procedural rights to juveniles might seem like a welcome advantage. But the juvenile justice system was structured to prevent administration of adult punishments to juveniles; giving adult procedural protections to juveniles may provide justification for those who want to give them
adult punishments. Moreover, giving juveniles almost every safeguard enjoyed
by adult criminal defendants brings juvenile court proceedings closer and closer
to the formalistic adult criminal system. The promise of the juvenile system was
"to divert youthful offenders from the rigors of the criminal justice system, both
at adjudication and for disposition. '37 Balancing the benefit of increased procedural protection against the benefit of more moderate sentencing is difficult. But
because children are seen as less culpable for their actions and more amenable
to intervention than adults, 38 it is reasonable to give juvenile judges more discre-

28.

387 US 1 (1967).

29.
30.
31.

See Note, 18 Cardozo L Rev at 2109-10 (cited in note 16).
See Gault, 387 US at 4.
See id at 5-6.

32.

See id at 6.

33.

See generally id.
See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets ihe Prindple of Offense: Punishment,Treatment, atd theDifference ItMakes, 68 BU L Rev 821, 826 (1988).
35. See Barry C. Feld, The Transfomation oftieJuvenile Court,75 Minn L Rev 691, 695 (1991).
36. See Margaret Talbot, The Maximum SecuriDy Adolescent, NY Times Magazine 41, 44 (Sept 10,

34.

2000).
37.
38.

Ainsworth, 36 BC L Rev at 927 (cited in note 19).
Schiraldi and Drizin, 100 Years ofthe Children's Court at 24 (cited in note 17).
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tion to tailor dispositions to individual needs in order to foster rehabilitation.
39
After all, if a youth's transgression is really just a symptom of his "real" needs,
then the ability to mold the judgment to the child's circumstances might be
more valuable than the procedural limits on the judge. The juvenile justice system makes this tradeoff in the hope that a thoughtfully constructed sentence will
assist the child more in the long run.
In re Winsp4' was the last in the series of watershed cases marking the end
of the American justice system's concern for the rehabilitative ideal. Here the
Supreme Court held that the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was
controlling and constitutionally required in juvenile court adjudications. 41 Commentators have suggested that a less strict standard might suffice were the true
objectives of the juvenile justice system rehabilitation and treatment alone.42 If
this suggestion is correct, In re Winsbh shows that courts were beginning to recognize other objectives, such as the protection of the public at large and the
desire to punish. In 1984, a California court recognized this shift 'The purposes
of the juvenile process have become more punitive, its procedures formalistic,
adversarial and public, and the consequences of conviction more harsh." 43 Serious offenders are now more frequently waived to adult courts and mandatory
minimum sentences are imposed more regularly on juveniles.44
The aforementioned court decisions were not solely responsible for turning
the retributive tide. Public demands also played a huge role in perpetuating the
cycle of increasingly punitive juvenile proceedings. During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the public's fear of rising crime, along with research that seemed to
indicate that rehabilitation efforts were ineffective, helped to shift the direction
of the juvenile justice system toward a "tough on crime" model.45 The public
soon began to demand stricter policies and punishments for juvenile delinquents 46 A strong desire to punish according to the seriousness of the offense
replaced public confidence in treatment and rehabilitation. 47 About half of the
states rejected, at least in part, the juvenile court's individualized sentencing philosophy, emphasizing instead statutory policies of retribution or incapacitation
and excluding youths charged with serious offenses from the juvenile court's

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 695 (cited in note 35).
397 US 358 (1970).
See generally id.
See Walkover, 31 UCLA L Rev at 521 (cited in note 9).
In rejavierA., 159 Cal App 3d 913, 963-64 (1984).
See Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 696 (cited in note 35).

45. See Eric L Jensen and Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the DeterrentEffet of Legirlative Waiver on ViolentJuvenile Crime, 40 Crime & Delinq 96, 96-97 (1994).

46. See Note, Serious and HabitualJuvenik Offender Statutes: Recondling Punishment and Rehabilitation
Within theJuvenile Justice System, 48 Vand L Rev 479, 485 (1995).
47. See Comment, What To Do With the Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and Realio About
Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling ofte JuvenileJustice System, 148 U Pa L Rev 1303, 1329 (2000).
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jurisdiction. 48 Within the past decade, the "just deserts" model, emphasizing
punishment according to the offense committed, has come to dominate
49
sentencing.
Virtually every state now has a mechanism for prosecuting juveniles as
adults.50 One such mechanism is the judicial waiver statute, which furnishes
judges with the discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court after a
hearing to establish whether the youth is receptive to treatment or a danger to
public safety.5 1 "National evaluations of judicial waiver provide compelling evidence that it is arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory. '5 2 Within single jurisdictions, courts have interpreted and applied the same law inconsistently.53 Factors
such as the youth's race or the location of the hearing may carry more weight
than the nature of the crime.5 4 By relinquishing a small fraction of its caseload
and portraying these juveniles as the most intractable and dangerous in the system, juvenile courts create symbolic scapegoats, appear to protect the public,
55
and deflect more comprehensive criticisms.
Another mechanism for trying juveniles as adults is the offense exclusion
statute. Legislative offense exclusion, by statutory definition, removes youths
charged with particular offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.5 6 They must be
tried in adult courts where the seriousness of the offense controls the sentencing
decision.5 7 The statutes entail value choices about the quality and quantity of
crime that the state will tolerate before mandatory adult punishment.58 Offense
exclusions provide yet another indicator of the shift to a more retributive sentencing philosophy and also suggest legislative uneasiness with the exercise of
judicial discretion.5 9 Using certain offenses to curb or eliminate judicial discretion renounces rehabilitation, confines juvenile court jurisdiction, and "denies
60
[juvenile courts] the opportunity even to try to treat certain youths."
Waiver and offense exclusion statutes have greatly increased the number of
juveniles within the adult system. The number of youths under eighteen housed
48. See Walkover, 31 UCLA L Rev at 511 (cited in note 10). See, for example, Wash Rev Code Ann
§ 13.40.010 (West 1993 & Supp 2001).
49. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78J Crim L & Criminology 471, 487 (1987).
50. See id at 488 (citing Donna Hamparian, et al, Youth in Adult Courts (justice Dept 1982)).
51.
See Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 701 (cited in note 35).

52.

See id at 703 (citing Donna Hamparian, et al, Youth in Adult Courts 104).

53. See Feld, 78 J Crim L & Criminol at 492 (cited in note 49).
54. See Jeffrey Fagan, Martin Forst & T. Scott Vivona, RacialDeterminants oftheJudidalTransfer Dedsion: Prosecuting Violent Youth in CriminalCourt, 33 Crime & Delinq 259, 263 (1987).
55. See M.A. Bormer, TraditionalRhetoric, OganizationalRealities: Remand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32
Crime & Delinq 53, 69-70 (1986).
56. Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 701 (cited in note 35).
57. Id. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 39.001 (2) (a) (West 1988 & Supp 2001).
58. Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 706 (cited in note 35).
59. Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 708 (cited in note 35). See generally Walkover, 31 UCLA L Rev at 52833 (cited in note 10).
60. Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 708 (cited in note 35).
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in adult prisons, and often intermingled with adult criminals, increased from
3,400 in 1985 to 7,400 in 1997.61 Most states disperse young inmates in the general prison population and provide no separate programs for them. 62 Juveniles in
adult facilities seldom receive case management to ensure that counseling, health
care, and education are integrated into their sentences. 63 Integration into the
general prison population proves very harmful to juvenile offenders since they
are more vulnerable than adults are to sexual exploitation and physical brutalization; they are also more likely to commit suicide.64 Sexual assault is five times
more likely and beatings by staff are twice as likely for juveniles housed in prisons as opposed to juvenile facilities. 65 "The long-term consequences of incarcerating young offenders for lengthy periods of time under these conditions are
dear-the release into society of an increasing number of dysfunctional middleaged men and women and the expenditure of vast sums to protect the public
from them. ' 66 Society must recognize that the children it locks away today in
adult facilities will one day reenter society, and the treatment they received during incarceration will greatly shape who they are and how they view the outside
world. 67
One study matched by age, race, gender, current charges, and past criminal
record 2,738 juveniles who had been prosecuted as adults with 2,738 who had
stayed in the juvenile system. 68 In the two years following release, 30 percent of
the teenagers prosecuted in criminal court were rearrested as compared to 19
percent of those who had gone through the juvenile system. 69 In addition, transferees to the adult system proved more likely to be arrested for more serious
offenses. 70 Another study reviewed fifty juvenile transfer cases and also concluded that recidivism rates are higher among juveniles transferred to adult
criminal court. 71 Is this because the juveniles sent to the adult system were correctly identified as being prone to commit future crime and therefore deserving
of more serious punishment? This logic seems too convenient. It is more likely
that passing juveniles into adult criminal court is counterproductive and increases crime in the long run. '"There is a much greater risk of repeated offenses
61. See Talbot, The Maximmn SecudyAdolescent at 42 (cited in note 36).
62. See id at 47.
63. See Martin Forst, Jeffrey Fagan and T. Scott Vivona, Youth in Prionsand TrainingSchools: Perceplions andConsequencer ofthe Treatment-Curtody Dichotomy, 40 Juv & Farn Ct J 1, 3 (1989).
64. See id at 9-10.
65. See id at 9.
66. Thomas F. Geraghty, JusticeforChildren:How Do IWe Get There?, 88 J Crim L & Criminology 190,
208 (1997).
67. See Catherine P, Guttman, Listen to the Children: The Decision to TransferJuveniles to Adult Court, 30
Harv CR-CL L Rev 507, 509 (1995).
68. See Talbot, The Maximum Sedey Adolescent at 58 (cited in note 36).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. James C. Howell, Juvenile Tranifers to the CriminalJustice System: State ofthe Art, 18 L & Pol 17, 5860 (1996).
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from someone who has paid for a past crime by a period of incarceration than
from someone who has helped to overcome whatever problems led to the
criminal behavior. 7 2 Sentencing a young child to a period of years in an adult
prison practically guarantees that he will grow and mature in an atmosphere with
no nurturing warmth, no positive role models, and no practical edification other
than thorough instruction in the ways of corruption and violence.7 3 The transfer
of juveniles to adult criminal court merely offers a tradeoff between short-term
public safety benefits and long-term harms of increased recidivism.7 4
Many academics have called for the abolition of the entire juvenile justice
system, saying that all juvenile offenders should enter the adult system. In their
view, a unified justice system is capable of recognizing the nuanced continuum
of actors' actual attributes "and accounting for it in devising appropriate and fair
sanctions for any individual's criminal law violations." 75 In a system that does
not make it necessary to decide whether an individual is a child or an adult,
more attention could be devoted to analyzing the individual characteristics of
each actor, with age acting as a mitigating factor.76 As one scholar notes:
With fiscal constraints, budget deficits, and competition from other interest
groups, there is little likelihood that treatment services for delinquents will expand.

Coupling the emergence of punitive policies with our societal unwillingness to
provide for the welfare of children in general, much less those who commit
crimes, there is simply no reason to believe that the juvenile court can be rehabilitated.

77

Short of abandoning the entire juvenile justice system, other theorists call
for abolishing the rehabilitative paradigm, averring that no available evidence
supports the supposition that treatment can significantly alter or improve the
behavior of delinquents. 78 They believe that maintaining a treatment goal "in the
expectation of therapeutic advancement sacrifices the interim generations of
youth to the abuses of unproved, or worse, disproved scientific and sociological
experimentation." 79 What the legislature terms "treatment" might just be a Pollyannish view of the judicial process. 80 In this model, the juvenile system would
continue to be separate but would be based on objectives such as incapacitation
72. Amy Lamson, Pychology ofJuvenile Crime 26 (Human Sciences 1983). See also Forst, Fagan and
Vivona, 40Juv & Farn CtJ at 11 (cited in note 63).
73. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Youth Crime-And What Not To Do About It, 31 Val U L Rev 435, 44344 (1997).
74. See Howell, 18 L & Pol at 50-51 (cited in note 71).
75. Ainsworth, 36 BC L Rev at 949 (cited in note 19).
76. See id.
77. Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 723 (cited in note 35).
78. See Note, 18 Cardozo L Rev at 2144 (cited in note 16) (citations omitted). See also Feld, 75
Minn L Rev at 703 (cited in note 35).
79. Note, 18 Cardozo L Rev at 2145 (cited in note 16).
80. See id at 2144.
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and retribution. No real effort would be made to rehabilitate the lost-cause delinquents.
Some rehabilitationists argue that if enough resources are spent on alternative programs, the American public might see some positive results. Boot camps
and wilderness challenges are just a few examples of programs that emphasize
internal discipline, self-reliance, teamwork, and individual accomplishment.81
Such programs vary greatly from state to state and some currently focus only on
serious, violent, and chronic offenders.82 Intensive supervision programs, which
provide enhanced probationary monitoring of juvenile offenders, have also been
used instead of incarceration for non-violent juveniles.8 3 Other schemes such as
the Florida Environmental Institute's Last Chance Ranch and the U.S. Department of Justice's Violent Juvenile Offender Program combine various elements
of treatment alternatives. Juveniles who have been transferred to and sentenced
in the adult criminal court may voluntarily elect to participate in the Last Chance
Ranch program, which provides residential care for a usual period of eighteen
months supplemented by six months of closely monitored aftercare.8 4 The program "provides discipline, strict supervision, intensive academic education, and
physical labor to fill community needs," and boasts a recidivism rate of only 33
percent 8 5 The United States Department of Justice offers another approach to
combating recidivism through the Violent Juvenile Offender Programs it has
organized in Boston, Detroit, Memphis, and Newark.8 6 After a period of confinement in a secure facility, youths are placed in transitional housing where they
receive additional treatment and their activities are closely monitored.87 The final
88
stage is reuniting the youths with their families or guardian upon release.
89
Unique programs such as these and other smaller community-based programs
successfully blend rehabilitation and punishment to reduce recidivism. 90 However, these programs are still few and far between, and with no nationwide
81. Note, 33 Am Crim L Rev at 1319-21 (cited in note 15). See generally Albert R. Roberts, Wilderness ProgramsforJuvenikOffenders:A ChallengingAlternative, 39 Juv & Farn Ct J 1 (1988).

82. See Roberts, 39Juv & Farn CtJ at 4 (cited in note 81).
83. See generally Richard Wiebush, Juvenile Justice Intensive Supervision: The Impact on Felony Offenders
Divertedfrom InslitulionalPlacement,39 Crime & Delinq 68 (1993).
84. See Note, 33 Am Crim L Rev at 1321-22 (cited in note 15), citing What Can We Do About Violence:A BillMoers Spedal (PBS television broadcast, Jan 9,1995).
85. See 33 Am Crim L Rev at 1322 (cited in note 15). See also US Dept ofJustice Office of Juvenile
Violent, and
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Guidefor Implemening the Comprebensive Strategyfor Serious,
ChronicJuvenileOffenders 156 (James C. Howell, ed, 1995) ("Guidefor Implementing).

86. See GuideforIplementingat 155 (cited in note 85).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Anna Rankin Mahoney, 'Man, I'm Already Dead" Sedous Juvenile Offenders in Context, 5 Notre
Dame J Ethics & Pub Pol 443, 460 (1991) (systemic alternatives and small facility networks have been
implemented in Massachusetts, Utah, Missouri, and Pennsylvania).
90. See Note, 33 Am Crim L Rev at 1324 (cited in note 15) (small facility networks maintaining rehabilitation and deterrence as their primary focus while still incorporating the punitive element of curtailing
juveniles' freedom enjoy the greatest success in lowering recidivism rates).
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commitment to incarceration alternatives, it is doubtful that the public's fear of
increased crime will be assuaged or its desire for retribution satisfied.
Obviously, scholars have long debated the juvenile justice system's failings
and needed reforms, but with all of the changes that have occurred in the last
fifty years, and even in the last ten years, is it academic discourse that shapes the
system? In reality, transformations in sentencing, state statutes, and justice goals
derive much of their stimulation and energy from mass media and the public. In
a system that metes out sanctions erratically, frequently leading to overdeterrence and disproportionate sentences, the public uproar, not statistical reality, drives present reform. 91 Dramatized media reporting labeling juveniles as
superpredators is extreme and even hysterical. 92 Although "less than one-half of
1 percent of all American kids were arrested for violent crimes [in 1998], the
majority of times that kids are portrayed on the evening news are in connection
with violence." 93 A single scandalous incident can shift the entire juvenile justice
system into a drastically more retaliatory mode, regardless of whether that incident truly mirrors juvenile crime trends. 94 Due to the abundance of "demagogic
clamor and public disinformation, the courts too often get blamed for adverse
social conditions over which they have very little control." 95 Moreover, despite
research evidencing that none of the tough legislative measures are successful in
preventing crime or decreasing recidivism, policymakers persist in enacting
them. 96 Rather than educating constituents about the complex nature of youth
crime and the juvenile justice system's limited ability to reduce it, "politicians
propose simplistic get-tough policies and pander to people's fears. 9 7 The
American juvenile justice system is therefore left in a state of perpetual limbo. It
rests on an unsound mixture of rehabilitation, punishment, illusory due process,
vagueness, and unpredictable outcomes. 98 Hopefully in the future policymakers
will change their response to societal panic and no longer adopt a doomed strategy.99 Ideally, "the conduct of the violent few should not govern policies as to
the role of the courts in the 21st century."10t

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
(1991).
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Note, 33 Am Crim L Rev at 1311 (cited in note 15).
See David Yellen, The Enduring Difference of Yonlb, 47 U Kan L Rev 995, 998 (1999).
Schiraldi and Drizin, 100 Years oftbe Children's Court at 26 (cited in note 17).
See Note, 33 Am Crim L Rev at 1335 (cited in note 15).
Charles E. Springer, Rebabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol 397, 410
See Note, 33 Am Crim L Rev at 1332 (cited in note 15).
Barry C. Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformationof the Juvenile Court 14 (Oxford 1999).
See id.
See Note, 33 Am Cim L Rev at 1331-32 (cited in note 15).
Hon. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., What oftbe Future?Envisioning an Effective Juvenile Court, 15-SPG Crim

Just 6, 7 (2000).
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H. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM OF GREAT BRITAIN
Great Britain's juvenile justice system began in the same manner as that of

the United States, with no separate juvenile facilities. 101 British courts tried and
sentenced children as adults, regardless of the offense committed. 102 The first
effort to make a distinction between juveniles and adults in the criminal system
was the Youthful Offenders Act of 1854, which created reformatory schools to
confine certain juvenile offenders after conviction. 103 The Act, however, did not
provide for a separate system by which to punish all juvenile offenders, and
most still served time in adult prisons. 104 '"ather than reforming the child, imprisonment in these adult institutions actually increased the possibility that the
105
child would violate the law again upon release."
Decades later, the Children's Act of 1908 was passed in response to the
growing assertion that the criminal justice system should treat children differ-,
ently than adults.106 This Act instituted juvenile courts throughout England,
Wales, Scotland and Ireland, 107 giving them jurisdiction over all offenses (excluding murder) committed by youths between seven and sixteen years of age.108
The intention of the legislature was to make the juvenile court an agency of
"rescue and reform as well as punishment."' 09 The Act was based on the idea
that "juveniles were in some way less responsible for their actions than adults
and so should be shielded from the full range of legal penalties." 110 Moreover,
reformers reasoned that juveniles integrated into adult facilities were likely to be
contaminated by the adult offenders."'
Great Britain's rehabilitative scheme expanded with the Children and Young
Persons Act of 1933.112 This Act formally placed a duty on the juvenile courts to
give first priority to the welfare of the juvenile.113 Therefore, courts could only
punish when punishment served the offender's best interests, not for any re101.

See Note, TheAge of CriminalResponsibiiy in an Era of Vioknce: Has GreatBritainSet a New Interna-

tionalStandard?, 28 Vand J Transnatl L 295, 299 (1995), citing Richard J. Terrill, World CriminalJusticeSystemsA Surv 78 (Anderson 1992).
102. See Patrick Wilson, Children Who Kill13-14 (Michael Joseph 1973).
103. See Note, 28 Vand J Transnatl L at 300, citing Terrill, World CriminalJustice Systems at 78 (cited in
note 101).
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See David P. Farrington, England and Waks, in Malcolm W. Klein, ed, Western Systems ofJuvenile
Justice73 (Sage 1984).
108. See Note, 28 Vand J Transnati L at 300, citing Terrill, World CriminalJusice Systems at 78 (cited in
note 101).
109. Farrington, Englandand Wales, in Klein, Western Systems ofJuvenileJustice at 75 (cited in note 107).

110.

Id.

111.
112.

See id.
Children and Young Persons Act of 1933, 23 Geo 5 c 12 (Eng).

113.

Id.
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tributive purpose." 4 However, the Act did stipulate that juveniles charged with
the offenses of murder, manslaughter, or wounding with the intent to do grievous bodily harm were to be tried in the separate Crown Court (a court for adult
offenders),u 5According to Section 53 of the Act, if a child is convicted of one
of these crimes and no other punishment is suitable, the offender can be detained but not punished by death." 6 This Section was enacted to protect society
from the small number of dangerous juveniles while providing a more humane
solution than the death penalty." 7 Although some speculated that the courts
used this Section to meet society's need to punish," 8 punishment under Section
53 was very rare in practice because it was only meted out for certain crimes and
when no other punishment was suitable. 19
Still more rehabilitative efforts were made with the Children and Young
Persons Act of 1963.120 Parliament raised the age of criminal responsibility to
ten and held that under this age a child was doli incapax,completely exempt from
any and all criminal responsibility.' 2' For children between the ages of ten and
fourteen, prosecutors were faced with a heightened burden of proof on the issue
of capacity. 22 To overcome the rebuttable presumption that these children were
incapable of committing crime, prosecutors had to show that the child committed the criminal act with "mischievous discretion," the ability to differentiate
right and wrong. 23 The 1963 Act illustrates a continued emphasis on the differences between adult and child offenders. At this time in the 1960s, when American courts had already begun formalizing the juvenile process and focusing on
the seriousness of the crime as the determinative factor in punishment, British
courts still concentrated on the juvenile offender's best interests.
The next proposed reforms to the British juvenile system did not take root.
In 1965 Parliament rejected a proposal to abolish the juvenile justice system and
replace it with "a family counsel composed of social workers and others selected
for their understanding and experience with juveniles."'124 This reorganization
would have emphasized treatment above all else and made juvenile proceedings
seem more like informal group counseling sessions. Another reform was the
Children and Young Persons Act of 1969, which was supposed to be the rebirth

114. See Glanville L. Williams, The CriminalResponsibiliy of Children, 1954 Crim L Rev 493, 495.
115. See J.H. Godsland and N.G. Fielding, Persons Convicted of Grave Crimes: The 1933 Children and
Yong Persons Act (ff
53) and its Effect Upon Children's Rigbts, 24 How J Crim just 282, 282 (1985).

116.
117.

Children and Young Persons Act § 53(2) (cited in note 112).
Id at § 53(l).

118.
119.
120.

See Godsland and Fielding, 24 How J Crim Just at 284-87 (cited in note 115).
See Note, 28 Vand J Transnatl L at 313 (cited in note 101).
Children and Young Persons Act of 1963, c 37 (Eng).

121.

Note, 28 Vand J Transnatl L at 307 (cited in note 101), citing J.C. Smith and Brian Hogan,

CriminalLaw 188-89 (Butterworths 7th ed 1992).
122. See Note, 28 Vand J Transnatl L at 309 (cited in note 101).
123. See id, citing Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law at 189 (cited in note 121).
124. Farrington, England a,,d Wales, in Klein, Western Systems ofJuvenileJustice at 75 (cited in note 107).
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and ultimate triumph of the welfare model.i 25 Based on the assumptions that
"juvenile delinquency was primarily caused by inadequate parents, defective
family relationships and social deprivation,' ' 26 the Act proposed that criminal
proceedings only be brought against children as a last resort.127 The intent was
to erase the line separating depraved children from consciously offending children and to substitute treatment for punishment.128 However, these provisions
currently do not influence the British juvenile justice system since the Act does
29
not contain a commencement date.
Progressing into the 1990s, when the demand in the United States for retributive punishments continued to soar, the Criminal Justice Act of 1991130
took the British juvenile justice system in a somewhat new direction. The Act
brings seventeen year olds into the juvenile system, abolishes all custodial sentences for offenders fourteen or younger, and officially changes the name of the
juvenile court to the Youth Court.' 31 Parliament viewed these changes and the
new name as more representative of the purposes of the juvenile court1 32 In
addition, the Act states that custodial sentences can only be imposed if any of
the following criteria are satisfied:
(1)the offense is serious enough that only a custodial sentence is justified; (2) the
offense is of a violent or sexual nature and the court determines that a custodial
sentence is necessary to protect the public from danger, or (3) an offender refuses
133
to serve a previously ordered community sentence.

Seriousness of crimes is not defined, leaving a great deal of discretion with
judges to interpret the Act's provisions and to consider all mitigating factors. 34
Therefore, like Section 53 of the 1933 Act, very few offenders end up facing
extremely harsh punishments under this provision because the court system on
the whole is required to protect troubled youth before sentencing them.135
136
Courts are prohibited from lengthening sentences for retributive purposes.
Parliament's intent in passing this provision was to reduce the tendency of the
courts to use custodial sentences as a sanction and to encourage the utilization
125.
126.

Caroline Ball, Young Offenders and the Youth Court, 1992 Crim L Rev 277,279.
Farrington, England and Wales, in Klein, Westem Systems ofJuvenile Justice
at 83-84 (cited in note

107).
127.

See Note, 28 VandJ Transnatl L at 315 (cited in note 101).

128.

John M. Gandy, Juvenile Justice in England and Scotland, in Paul C. Friday and V. Lome Stewart,

eds, Youth
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Crime andJuvenileJustice 17 (Praeger 1977).
See Ball, 1992 Crim L Rev at 279 (cited in note 125).
See Criminal Justice Act of 1991, c 53 (Eng).
See id.
See Ball, 1992 Crim L Rev at 284 (cited in note 125).
Note, 28 Vand J Transnad L at 322 (cited in note 101).
See id at 322.
See Ball, 1992 Crim L Rev at 286 (cited in note 125).
See Note, 28 VandJ Transnatl L at 319 (cited in note 101).
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of noncustodial sentences. 137 Imposition of noncustodial sentences forces society and parents to take more responsibility for the development and discipline
of their children.

138

Both the police and the courts possess a large degree of discretion in today's
British system. For example, even if police have sufficient evidence to convict a
juvenile in court, they can spend weeks looking into the offender's background,
interviewing his family, getting records from social service and educational departments, and interviewing the juvenile.139 In fact, since the overwhelming majority of British juvenile delinquents are not repeat offenders, a police warning is
often the most successful way of precluding future crime.14° On the court level,
a common disposition is a supervision order where various conditions can be
imposed, such as requirements to live in a certain place, to abide by a curfew, or
to participate in specified activities for up to ninety days. 141 The goal is to introduce the juvenile to a different environment where he can develop new personal
relationships and interests. 142 Juveniles can also be sent to attendance centers
where they must go for a certain number of hours every few weeks to participate in varied constructive activities. 143 In addition, first time offenders pleading
guilty to charges can draw up a type of contract with a youth panel, specifying
the manner in which reparation will be made to the victim as well as any other
requirements such as participating in counseling sessions, community service
projects, or educational arrangements. 144 But despite a relaxed rehabilitative approach to most youth offenders, the court retains the power to isolate the few
serious repeat delinquents. For example, the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Bill enables the court to impose longer sentences on persistent offenders aged
twelve to fourteen, enlarges the category of serious offenses for which children
may receive extended periods of detention, and doubles the maximum period of
detention for young offenders aged fifteen to seventeen from twelve months to
twenty-four months. 145 Clearly then, authorities in Great Britain have several

avenues to explore when it comes to sentencing a juvenile, but the most recent
get tough measures have been aimed only at persistent offenders and those who
commit serious violent or sexual crimes.' 46
137.

See id at 322.

138. See Andrew Ashworth, Non-CustodialSentences, 1992 Crim L Rev 242, 243.
139. Farrington, Englandand Wales, in Klein, Western Systems ofJuvenileJusticeat 76 (cited in note 107).
140. Home Office, No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales
(Nov 1997), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cpd/jou/nme.htm ("No More Excuses).
141. Farrington, England and Wales, in Klein, Western Systems of Juvenile Justice at 80-81 (cited in note

107).
142. See id.
143. Seeid at 81.
144. Home Office, No More Excuses (cited in note 140).
145. See Terence Shaw, Howard's Core Law Reforms Survive Intact CriminalJustice Bilk Despite a Turbulent
Passage,Measures Against Terrorists, Raves and New Age Travellers Will Win RoyalAssent, Daily Telegraph (London) 11 (Oct 29, 1994).
146. See Alex Duval Smith, Conservatives: Cracking Down on Crime, The Guardian (London) Ell (Oct
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Great Britain's Home Office has recently issued statements explaining that
the new principal aim of the youth justice system is to prevent offenses from
occurring.1 47 According to the Office, "allowing young people to drift into a life
of crime undermines their welfare and denies them the opportunity to develop
into full contributing members of society."' 48 Therefore, current goals include
quicker determinations of guilt or innocence, a more open system commanding
public confidence, and processes focusing on the character of offending behavior and how to remedy it.149 For example, parents of convicted young offenders
can receive Parenting Orders that require attendance at counseling for up to
three months and possibly other requirements, such as seeing that their child
gets to school every day.150 Parenting sessions attempt to enhance communication skills, boundary setting, and positive discipline methods. 151 In this manner,
the offender's home environment can be improved and parents are forced to
start accepting responsibility for their children's behavior.1 52 The Chairman of
the Youth Justice Board'5 3 notes:
Some parents just have not thought that they need to change the way they treat
their children and this Order will enable them to give their parental responsibilities
a lot more thought These courses have been proven to work effectively and parents have noticed a 154
real difference in how they can relate to their children and
shape their behavior.

Detention and Training Orders have also been instituted, allowing an offender to spend one half of his sentence in custody and the other half under
community supervision. 5 5 These Orders are imposed only when custody is the
sole option and contain provisions for modifying the custodial element based on
the offender's progress or lack thereof.5 6 Therefore, juveniles who really want
to change and make progress can do so, and their advances can be rewarded
with shortened sentences. This system ensures continual monitoring of the offender's behavior and a completely individualized sentence that is neither an
over nor an underdeterrent.
The new system also focuses on filling in the gaps that criminality leaves
11, 1994).
147.

See Home Office, No More Excuses (cited in note 140).

148.
149.

Id.
See id.

150.

See Youth Justice Board, Parents To Be ForcedTo Take Responsibiliy For Their Children (une 1,

2000), available at http://www.youth-justice-board.gov.uk/view-pr.cfm?PRID=51 ("Parentf).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. "The Youth Justice Board was established under the Crime & Disorder Act of 1998 to lead the
reforms of the youth justice system." Id.
154. Id.
155. See Home Office, No More Excuses (cited in note 140).
156. See id.
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behind in terms of victims and the offenders themselves. Reparation orders may
be issued to offenders, which might involve writing letters of apology, apologizing to the victim in person, or repairing criminal damage. 57 Vocational and educational training is also available to remedy the disadvantages of child offenders.
For example, assistance will be given to help children achieve in primary schools
through literacy and mathematics programs. 5 8 It is hoped that by providing
opportunities for jobs, training, and leisure, fewer children will resort to crime to
make up for their lack of material resources or for "disadvantages of their marginal social position.' 5 9 Instead of being a lost cause with no skills to fall back
on after leaving custody, a juvenile offender in Great Britain is provided with
some means to avoid being a repeat player in the system. After all, it must be
true that society as a whole will be better off with as many productive members
as possible and with as many open minds as possible who are ready to take part
in the healing process. In one author's words, "in Europe we still take the view
that these are our children. We brought them up. I don't see that in the United
States where youth justice, mental health and child welfare are about other peo160
ple's children."'
A number of current reforms concentrate on those children most at risk of
becoming involved in crime. Thirty-seven Youth Inclusion Programs are being
established by the Youth Justice Board in some of the most highly deprived
areas in England and Wales. 161 These programs will give high-risk children ages
thirteen to sixteen "access to after-school clubs, sports, and the arts, as well as
education and training, mentoring, and addiction support."' 162 The aim is to
work with children before they become entangled in a life of crime, thereby
cutting down on juvenile offenses. 163 The Youth Justice Board's Chairman avers:
The new system for changing behaviour, involving victims, better parenting,
speeding up youth justice and constructive custody are now coming on stream ...
Even if there is a surge in some forms of youth crime we now have structures and
systems to respond. We should give the trained professionals a chance to demonstrate the success of the new system. We must avoid being panicked into glib solu164
tions, like locking up more children, that do little to tackle the causes of crime.

This statement seems to illustrate that in Great Britain proper rehabilitative solutions are more important than moral panic. Instead of public outcry and mass
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Christian Pfeiffer, JuvenileJusice and Violence in Europe, 23 Crime & Just 255, 301 (1998)
160. Interview by Emily Buss with Michael Little (Sept 7, 2000) (on file with author).
161. Youth Justice Board, YJB Targets
Over 100 Estates (uly 26, 2000), available at http://www.youthjustice-board.gov.uk/viewpr.cfm?PRID=56.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Youth Justice Board, A Year of Progress Ouly 5, 2000), available at http://www.youth-jusiceboard.gov.uk/viewpr.cfm?PRID=55.
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media hype, modifications in child justice should be made with the long-term
best interests of both the child and society in mind.
I. THE Two SYSTEMS AT WORK
Two modem day cases, Vv UnitedKingdom 165 and In reAbraham, 66 further illustrate the differences between the juvenile justice systems of the United States
and Great Britain. V v UnitedKingdom involved the trial of two ten-year-old boys,
Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, who kidnapped two-year-old James Bulger from a shopping mall in 1993.167 Venables and Thompson led Bulger to a
secluded area over two miles away from the shopping center where they
stomped on him and kicked him, then bludgeoned him to death with bricks and
an iron bar. 68 After murdering Bulger, the two boys attempted to conceal their
crime by placing the body across railroad tracks, hoping a train would hit it.169
Venables and Thompson were the youngest persons to face a murder trial in
Great Britain in the twentieth century.170
In light of the ages of all the children involved and the gruesome nature of
the crime, the trial attracted unparalleled national publicity.7 1 The British public
and media expressed shock and sadness but also concern for the defendants,
wondering what could have engendered such violent behavior. The media was
quick to point out that both boys came from broken homes, had alcoholic
mothers, and exhibited behavioral problems at school.172 Evidence showed that
in the home of one of the boys there had been over four hundred videos in the
few preceding years, sixty-four of which contained violence or soft pornographic material.17 3 Politicians were soon demanding a ban on horror videos and
the Anglican Bishop of Liverpool was calling for a recommitment to marriage. 174
According to one author, "[i]f their crime becomes an excuse for the vindictiveness by all and sundry... the evil will grow and spread. Our only hope of limiting the damage is to keep trying to understand what happened."' 175
The Crown Court sentenced Venables and Thompson under Section 53 of
165.
166.
167.

Venables & Thompson HL, 3 All ER 97 (Eng HL 1997).
599 NW 2d 736 (Miech Ct App 1999).
See generally Venables & Thompson HL, 3 All ER 97 (Eng HL 1997).

168.

See id.

169. Seeid.
170. , alcolm Holland, Gruesome Find on St. Valentine's Day Left Nation Stunned, South China Morning
Post 20 (Nov 25, 1993).
171.

See Comment, V v. United Kingdom: Is It a 'New Deai"forProsecutingChildren asAdults, 16 Conn
125 (2000).

J Ind L 117,
172.

See Holland, Gruesome Find on St. Valentine'sDay Left Nation Stunned (cited in note 170).

173. See Bill Schiller, EtilFreaks ofNature' Get Lifefor Murdering Tot, Ps'ehiatristsProbe Twisted Fantasy,
Toronto Star Al (Nov 25, 1993).

174.

See id.

175. Germaine Greet, Love, Not Hate, Will Heal the Tragedy of Three SmallBoys, The Guardian (London)
18 (Nov 29, 1993).
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the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 to be detained at Her Majesty's
pleasure. 176 Amid a whirlwind of media hype and public sympathy for the Bulger
family, the Secretary of State imposed a fifteen-year tariff on Venables and
Thompson, meaning that they would serve a minimum of fifteen years of the
indefinite sentence. 177 The House of Lords subsequently overturned the decision
of the Secretary of State, ruling that the Secretary had to remain neutral from
public pressures and could not impose a tariff that did not take into account the
progress and development of a detained child. 178 This decision was made not
only for the boys' welfare, but because the House of Lords felt that the public
had an interest in ensuring what had been achieved in the boys' upbringing was
not wasted. 79 Therefore, Venables and Thompson will be detained until age
eighteen when a special three-person panel, which must include a judge and a
psychiatrist, will decide whether the offenders no longer pose a danger to the
public and whether they have shown appropriate remorse for the crime. 180
Even though the sentence was adjusted, the European Court of Human
Rights still found that the application of the full rigors of an adult, public trial
deprived the defendants of the opportunity to participate effectively in the determination of the criminal charges against them.'8' The Court suggested that a
modified juvenile procedure be used, which would take into account a defendant's age, level of maturity, and intellectual and emotional capacities. 182 While
this decision does not overturn the conviction of Venables and Thompson, it
does mean that changes might soon be made in how juveniles are tried throughout Europe. 8 3 European nations will have to reexamine their trial procedures to
establish whether, according to the new standards, they allow child offenders
full participation in trials.' 84 If not, their procedures must be changed, even if it
means treating certain child offenders in a manner substantially different than
85
adults.
In re Abraham involved the trial of eleven-year-old Nathaniel Abraham for
the fatal shooting of one victim and the nonfatal shooting of another. 186 Abraham "broke into a house and stole a .22 caliber rifle, practiced shooting at bal176. See Edward Pilkington, LiverpoolBoys Jailedjor"Cunning" Murderof Toddler, Gazette (Montreal) Al
(Nov 25, 1993).
177. See V v UnitedKingdom, 30 Eur Ct HR Rep 121, 135 (1999).
178. See id at 137.
179. Alan Travis, The Bulger Decision: New Identifies Will Hide Old Lives: The Future 18:year-olds Will Be
Given Protectionand Many Years ofSupenision, The Guardian (London) 3 (Oct 27, 2000).
180.

See id.

181.

See Vv United Kingdom, 30 Eur HR Rep at 137.

182.

See id at 179.

183. See Clare Dyer and Alan Travis, Boy Kallers DeniedFairTial European Court of Human Rdghts Ruling on James Buiger Case Forces Radical Changes in Way ChildrenAre Tried, The Guardian (London) 1 (Dec 17,

1999).
184.
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loons and streetlights, and stated an intention to shoot gang members who had

been bothering him."187 The day after the incident, Abraham was heard boasting
about the shooting.188 He was charged with "one count of first-degree premeditated murder, one count of assault with intent to commit murder, and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony." 189 After a
probable cause hearing the trial court permitted Abraham to be tried in an adult
court, where the jury subsequently found him guilty of second-degree murder. 190
The court then exercised its discretion to sentence Abraham according to the
juvenile sentencing guidelines rather than the adult guidelines. 191 This sentence,
which called for incarceration until the age of twenty-one, might have been the
harsher route to take since the adult guidelines only call for a sentence of six to
192
fifteen years.
Instead of expressing concern about Abraham's family life or his mental capacity,193 the American public was outraged at the leniency of his sentence. In
reference to prosecuting Abraham as an adult, one Michigan citizen suggested,
"If youngsters are old enough to load the gun and shoot someone they are old
enough to pay the price." 194 Another individual opined that "the verdict was
inappropriate... [he] should have been convicted of first-degree murder and
executed."195 One man felt that the verdict "should not be any different because
of his age. Instead of second-degree murder, Abraham deserved to be guilty of
first-degree murder." 196 Such statements dearly illustrate the ever-present
American need for retribution, even when the defendant is eleven years old. As
evidenced by other cases involving young murder defendants, 197 if Abraham
were just a few years older, his incarceration probably would have been for a
much longer period.
These two cases illustrate once again the emphasis the United States places
on retribution and punishment versus the importance of treatment and reform
in Great Britain. Venables and Thompson committed a heinous crime at a very
young age, but the emotions of the public were not complete fury and rage
against the two. Surely, some anger and sadness were present, but one of the
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See Comment, 16 ConnJ Ind L at 136 (cited in note 171).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See In re Abraham, 597 NW 2d at 836. Psychological reports indicate that Abraham had the
intellect of a six to eight-year-old child with an IQ of seventy-eight.
194. Ben Woodall, Letter, Detroit News A12 (Nov 18, 1999).
195. Mike Halligan, Letter, Detroit News A12 (Nov 18, 1999).
196. Raymond Marcoux, Letter, Detroit News A12 (Nov 18, 1999).
197. See Louisianav Wilkerson, 704 So 2d 1 (La App 1997) (fourteen-year-old defendant sentenced to
seventeen years of hard labor for his second-degree murder conviction). See also Naovaratbv State, 779 P2d
944 (Nev 1989) (thirteen year old sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole for his first
degree murder conviction).
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most prominent sentiments was concern for youths who have emotional and
mental difficulties as well as disadvantaged home situations.1g8 The public and
media did not push for a toughening of the juvenile justice system. The goal of
the system was still to concentrate on rehabilitation. The United States, on the
other hand, seemed to be leaning even further away from the rehabilitative ideal.
Even though Abraham was tried as an adult, the public was infuriated when he
was not convicted of a more serious crime or sentenced for a longer period.
Despite the similarities of the offenders, the outcomes of these trials and the
reactions of the public could not have been more different.
IN. ALEX'S FATE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
Although both the American and British juvenile justice systems grew from
the same underlying premises, they have proceeded down divergent paths. To
demonstrate the practical differences between these systems, as well as the
changes that have occurred in both over time, I would like to look at the conviction and sentencing of a juvenile like Alex in the United States and in Great
Britain in 1962 (when A Clockwork Orange was first published) and today. The
juvenile justice system in the United States in 1962 had not yet undergone the
revolutions of Kent, Gault, and Winshto, so the informal role of the courts was to
a certain degree still intact. However, theorists had already begun arguing that
nothing works to rehabilitate, so Alex might have faced a court willing to incorporate more punishment than rehabilitation. This retributive element would
mean meting out justice according to the crime committed, not according to the
needs of the individual, and might have been used to allay any public fear of
rising juvenile crime. Alex would most likely have been sentenced to incarceration for the remainder of his minority or for a time to be determined by the
presiding judge. He probably would not have been tried in an adult court because the demand for juvenile waiver was not yet pressing. In all likelihood, Alex
would also not have been sentenced to death since the get tough policies on
crime had not yet reached today's level of moral panic.
As a fifteen year old who had committed murder, Alex would face the
harshest environment possible in the United States today. The major retributive
reformation of American juvenile courts has taken root, and rehabilitation is no
longer the main goal of the system. If Alex found himself in a state with a discretionary waiver statute, a judge might deem that the seriousness of the offense
requires the punishment of either life imprisonment in an adult facility or the
198. See generally Greer, Love, Not Hate (cited in note 175) ('To reveal the boys' identities, to describe their families and pass summary judgment on them too, [is] to compound the evil. Only if we can
make the imaginative leap to know what it is like to be an inattentive, unmotivated boy sagging off from
school,... collecting abuse and insult from people close and distant, immobilised in futile, self-destructive
postures, will we overcome by love the evil that has suddenly blossomed in the midst of our rational,
humane society.").
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death penalty. 199 Alternatively, if the state had a statutory offense exclusion for
murder, Alex would be automatically transferred (without the exercise of judicial
discretion) to adult court jurisdiction and subject to adult penalties 200 In a state
with a statute proscribing mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes,
Alex could be mechanically sentenced to a period of incarceration set by the
legislature, without reference to any mitigating circumstances 2 01 Alex remaining
within the juvenile justice system is the least likely scenario.202 Although within
juvenile jurisdiction he would surely be incarcerated for the rest of his minority,
this situation would do little to assuage the public's desire for retribution.
In the British 1962 system, Alex would fall under Section 53 of the Children
and Young Persons Act of 1933. If no other punishment were justified, he
would be incarcerated for an indeterminate amount of time but would not face
the death penalty.2°3 However, since the rehabilitative purpose drove the British
system and Section 53 justifies indefinite imprisonment only if no other punishment is suitable, Alex probably would have received a less severe punishment.204 The court might have looked in depth at his family situation and social
circumstances and decided that a different punishment better suited Alex's
needs. At this time, adjudication was more about the needs of the juvenile than
the crime committed and the court was still under the duty to place the welfare
of the child above all else. 205 So although the charges would probably not be set
aside, Alex might instead be incarcerated for a shorter period or be granted probation under the court's supervision.
In Great Britain today, where the goal of the juvenile justice system is to
prevent repeat offenses, the court would want to get to the source of Alex's
criminal behavior. Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1991, the court may only
impose a custodial sentence if the offense is serious enough, with the term "serious" being open to the court's interpretation. 206 A tough court might hold that
murder, no matter what the circumstances, justifies a custodial sentence because
of its seriousness or because the public needs to be protected. He could therefore be tried in the Crown Court for murder, but the trial procedures would
have to be modified to allow for his full participation, as called for by the European Court of Human Rights. 20 7 If sentenced to detainment at Her Majesty's
199. See Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 701 (cited in note 35). See, for example, Iowa Code Ann
§ 232.22.2.c (West 2000).
200. See Iowa Code Ann S 232.22.2.c (West 2000).
201. See, for example, Ala Code § 12-15-71.1(a), (b) (Supp 2000); NY Penal Law S 70.05.3 (MeKinney 1998 and Supp 2001); Wash Rev Code Ann § 13.40.160 (1) (West 2000).
202. See Talbot, The Maximum SecudAdolescent at 42 (cited in note 36).
203.
204.

23 Geo 5 c 12 § 53 (2).
See Note, 28 Vand J Transnatl L at 299 (cited in note 101).

205.
206.
207.

See Children and Young Persons Act of 1933, 23 Geo 5 c 12.
See Note, 28 Vand J Transnatl L at 322 (cited in note 101).
See Andrew Loudon, Six Years On, Are Thb Sony Yet ForTheirAct of Eil,The Daily Mail (Lon-

don) 6, (Dec 17, 1999).
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pleasure, Alex would remain incarcerated until age eighteen, at which time his
progress would be evaluated to see if he had adequately rehabilitated himself.2 °8
A more moderate court might agree that Alex should complete a custodial sentence but allow the time to be spent in a local accommodation close to Alex's
family. Still a more lenient court placing heavier weight on mitigating factors
might opt for a Detention and Training Order where Alex would be incarcerated for half of his sentence and would spend the other half under community
supervision.209 Any court would almost certainly also order reparation to be
made in the form of an oral or written apology to the victim's family. 210 In addition to these sentences, or perhaps as a condition of probation, Alex's family
could be required to attend counseling sessions to aid in any family problems
21
that might have added to his criminal behavior. '
The different publishing receptions of A Clockwork Orange dearly indicate a
divergence in public views regarding juvenile justice and the rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders. Using the novel as a springboard, my goal has been to trace
the historical developments of both the American and British juvenile justice
systems and to examine the practical differences between them. Comparing the
two systems shows a variety of similarities such as the initial need to treat juveniles differently than adults and to guard the welfare of the child. However, the
disparities in the two systems are somewhat striking. Over the past few decades,
the United States has cracked down on juvenile offenders due to fear of rising
juvenile violence and the seemingly urgent need to protect society. The rehabilitative purpose has been almost completely erased by the retributive model, and a
child facing adult court adjudication is a common occurrence. Viewing juvenile
justice today, the truncated ending of A Clockwork Orange is not at all surprising.
A juvenile pushed through the adult courts will not learn to correct his behavior.
He will instead be ready to commit more crime when he is free and become a
repeat player in the system.
Great Britain has maintained rehabilitation as a major foundation of its juvenile justice system, and any steps toward punitive measures have been taken
only against narrow groups of persistent and violent offenders. The constraint
still remains on courts to mete out justice for the needs of individuals, not for
the retributive desires of the public. The current aim of preventing repeat offenses offers youths greater opportunities to reenter society as more productive
citizens and to remedy the behavior that brought them to juvenile courts in the
first place. Alexes in Great Britain undoubtedly have to be accountable for their
actions and realize that immediate consequences exist for their wrongdoings, but
they also have more opportunities to develop vocational skills and community
208.

See Alan Travis, The Bulger Decision:New Identities Will Hide Old Lives: The Future 18:year-olds Will

Be Given Protectionand Many Years of Supervision at 3 (cited in note 179).
209. See Home Office, No More Excuses (cited in note 140).
210. See id.
211. See Youth Justice Board, Parents(cited in note 150).
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ties that will help them lead law-abiding lives. The ending of the British novel
embodies the idea that people, especially young people, can pay the price for
their wrongs, learn from their mistakes, and move on.
V. CONCLUSION

Children all over the world face similar problems and temptations, albeit in
different cultures. Living in Chicago is definitely different than living in London,
but perhaps the differences we see in children are not about time zones, climates, or accents. Perhaps the real difference lies in the way that a particular
country's system treats children after they make mistakes. Will the child be
thrown away as a lost cause or will he be placed in an environment where he can
get to the root of his problems and learn to change his behavior? Surely there is
no easy answer to the question of what rehabilitative measures and what punitive measures must be mixed to create the most beneficial juvenile justice system. Yet, by comparing the different systems, perhaps policymakers can find
what their own system lacks.
The United States should learn from the British example that rehabilitation
still has a place in today's juvenile justice system. Certainly punishment should
still be incorporated since juveniles must learn that consequences exist for their
crimes. However, making retribution the lodestar is detrimental. Children are
physically at risk in adult prisons and children released from incarceration have
no educational or vocational skills to utilize. I believe that more resources on a
national scale should be devoted to community-based and intensive supervision
programs that blend rehabilitation and discipline to reduce recidivism rates.
Educational and vocational training should play the most prominent role in any
sentencing program so that the juvenile has skills to lead a crime-free lifestyle
and earn an honest living when he completes his sentence. Individual and family
counseling sessions should also be a part of juvenile sentencing so that any emotional or relational problems can be addressed rather than ignored. After all, as
the British have already discovered, maintaining a society with as many productive citizens as possible is the best policy. If the United States could loosen its
hold on retribution, give rehabilitation enough time and resources to play a role
in the juvenile system once again, I think the benefits to each individual child's
welfare as well as society's welfare would be worthwhile. Perhaps then some of
the optimism concerning Alex's ability to reform can be brought from one continent to the other.

